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The primary objective of the essay is to draw the consequences of a truly 
consistent deployment of the utopian desire that animates Georg 
Lukács’s The Theory of the Novel. On the one hand, it is quite evident that 
for Lukács the theory of the novel is a utopian means of the destruction 
of the novel form itself. On the other hand, however, I argue that Lukács 
also shows that this utopian desire for the destruction of the novel form is 
in reality an essential component of the novel form itself. As a result, the 
novel form is by definition an attempt to imagine what from the 
perspective of this form remains unimaginable: a world without the novel. 
The contemporary relevance of this argument, however, remains 
obscured until we free it from one of Lukács’s basic metaphysical 
limitations: we must question the central status of the category of the 
“world” for the theory of the novel. 
The idea of the “novel” and the idea of the “world” seem to attract 
each other with an unusually strong force.1 Regardless of whether we 
conceive of this relation as a natural consequence of our metaphysical 
realities or a never quite accomplished historical destiny, the two 
concepts seem to mirror each other in infinitely complex ways. In fact, 
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the two categories have been orbiting each other for so long now that 
today we find it hard to fully tell them apart. There is the lurking suspicion 
in the back of our minds that, on a certain level, our age has been 
defined by the ambiguous approximation and sinister doubling of these 
elusive yet strangely self-evident categories. Whether this age has 
already come to an end is one of the possible metaphysical questions of 
our times.  
In order to test the true strength of this cosmic attraction, we can 
start here with a thought experiment that, one might argue, remains 
Kantian in spirit. In the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space, 
Kant asks us to perform the following exercise. First, let us start by 
removing in our imagination every single object one-by-one from space. 
Nothing could be easier. After we removed the final remaining object 
from space, all we are left with is space itself. Up to this point, our 
imagination performs its duties as expected. But, then, as a last step, we 
are ordered to remove space itself from this otherwise empty existence. 
Here, our cognitive faculties fail us. Obviously, we reached a boundary 
that the human mind cannot cross.2  
Kant, of course, uses this argument to establish the necessity (and, 
hence, the universality) of space as a pure form sensuous intuition - 
which is not the problem that I intend to pursue here at all. I would like to 
propose a more modest version of this exercise that retains only its basic 
structure as an experiment: let us try to identify an entity whose 
imaginary elimination as a representation proves to be unusually difficult 
if not impossible for us today. The question that, therefore, emerges is the 
following: Can the subtraction of entities taken for granted by our 
historical experience be pushed to a limit where this exercise forces a 
crisis of imagination that reveals something about the fundamental 
structures of this experience? To put it differently, the question is not only 
what it is that we cannot imagine today, but also what it is that we 
cannot not imagine?  
Thus, abandoning the concrete context and actual content of the 
Kantian argument, we can design a structurally similar experiment about 
the novel for our own age. Can we thematize the relation between the 
novel and the world by trying to imagine them without each other? Can 
we imagine a novel without the world and a world without a novel? At 
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what point will this separation force a crisis for our imagination? Where 
does our imagination fail us in this experiment? Can we establish the 
necessity of the world or the necessity of the novel or the necessity of 
their relations through a quasi-metaphysical deduction? On a 
methodological level, the ultimate goal of such an experiment would be 
to try to produce an understanding of the novel that is devoid of any 
reference to the category of the world in order to test the hypothesis that 
the very concept of the world that we often employ in our critical 
engagements is itself a novelistic concept. The relation of the two 
concepts seems to have produced a critical short circuit: the only proof 
we have of the existence of the world is the evidence of the novel; and 
yet the novel must be judged in relation to the world as if the latter were 
an independent entity from the novel. It is possible that the time has 
come to break this circuit.  
So, to start this experiment, let us pose a first question: Is it 
possible for us today to imagine a world without the novel? The question 
is, of course, ambiguous as its historical scope is not immediately 
obvious. Needless to say, we all know that, taken in a specific sense, 
there was a world without the novel – the world before the historical 
emergence of the novel form. In fact, regardless of when we think the 
birth of the novel actually took place, this world must have been in 
existence significantly longer than anything resembling a world in which 
the novel form has already come to fruition. Taken in this sense, the 
question would remain quite trivial and would have very little to offer for 
our reflection. Another possibility, therefore, opens up when we take the 
question to ask something about our future. Would it be possible to 
imagine a future world in which the novel no longer exists? A world in 
which it is no longer practiced as a possible form of artistic expression 
and is seen at best as a quaint relic of a glorious (or not so glorious) 
past? This question is, of course, already familiar to us as the 20th century 
announced a number of times the “death of the novel.” A common 
concern here appeared to have been what would “replace” the novel as 
the quintessential expression of the age: what would be the “novel” of an 
age without the novel?3 
While the question about a future without the novel is more 
intriguing than the one about the past, there is also a third option that we 
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have not yet considered. What happens when we take the question to 
address the actual present of the novel – not only our current historical 
moment but the entire period when the novel was present as a dominant 
form of literary expression? In this case, the attempt to imagine a world 
without the novel might first appear to be a historical absurdity. But the 
point here is, of course, not to write an alternative history in which we try 
to imagine a modernity without the novel (as if we wanted to raise the 
question “what if the novel never existed?”). To the contrary, the goal is to 
understand the actual historical unfolding of the genre of the novel and 
to inquire what this history has to do with the question of a world without 
the novel. For, it is not impossible to argue that the question is in reality 
internal to the novel form itself and, as such, functioned as a novelistic 
means of reflecting on the historicity of the form itself. 
Posing the problem in these terms is not quite fortuitous. In its final 
paragraphs, Georg Lukács’s The Theory of the Novel bequeathed to its 
posterity the exact same problematic.4 Here Lukács raised the possibility 
that a new world was in the process of being born that was no longer 
going to be the age of the novel. As we learn from Lukács’s famous 1962 
preface to the book, this theory of the novel (that is at the same time a 
projection of a utopian world without the novel) is best understood as a 
rejection of the historical world that provided the immediate context for 
the writing of the book. Lukács insists on the significance of the fact that 
this little book was written “in a mood of permanent despair over the 
state of the world.”5 The subjective condition for this theory was, therefore, 
the utopian rejection of WWI and bourgeois society. The first impulse for 
the theory of the novel was a desire for a withdrawal from the world that 
failed to live up to its own promises. When the world ceased to be a 
world, the theory of the novel became a possible and necessary exercise 
in the utopian imagination.6  
What this new world will be like is hard to tell, but three things 
stand out in Lukács’s admittedly speculative conclusions. 
1. Discussing Tolstoy’s novels, Lukács notes that in spite of the fact 
that Tolstoy is correctly considered to be something like the “final 
expression of European Romanticism,” “in the few overwhelmingly great 
moments of his works […] he shows a clearly differentiated, concrete and 
existent world, which, if it could spread out into a totality, would be 
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completely inaccessible to the categories of the novel and would require 
a new form of artistic creation: the form of the renewed epic.”7 These 
words suggest that the emergent world that no longer would be 
accessible to the categories of the novel is going to be once again an 
“epic” world. No doubt, this will be a renewed epic appropriate for the 
historical conditions of its production, but its fundamental register will 
nevertheless remain that of the epic. While the novel is “the epic of a 
world that has been abandoned by God,” the world without the novel will 
be once again the age of the epic (as, this time, the novel is going to be 
abandoned by the world).8  
2. The return to the epic is justified by Lukács’s brief descriptions of 
this new world as an escape from the torments of modernity: “This world 
is the sphere of pure soul-reality in which man exists as man, neither as a 
social being nor as an isolated, unique, pure and therefore abstract 
inferiority.”9 Apparently, in this new world the human being would be 
revealed in its self-sufficient singularity beyond the divisions that defined 
its fate in the age of modernity. Neither a social being nor an isolated 
individual, this new human being is going to be simply itself facing a new 
totality: “If ever this world should come into being as something natural 
and simply experienced, as the only true reality, a new complete totality 
could be built out of all its substances and relationships. It would be a 
world to which our divided reality would be a mere backdrop, a world 
which would have outstripped our dual world of social reality by as much 
as we have outstripped the world of nature.”10 The incomplete totality of 
the age of the novel could be once again rounded off as social 
antagonism itself becomes reduced to a mere backdrop, not unlike the 
way we already relate to the “war of all against all” of nature today. This 
world “this new world, remote from any struggle against what actually 
exists,” thus, would restore the immanence of meaning in life.11 In a 
certain sense, (as a complete totality) it would restore the world itself to 
its status as an authentic world that can be once again inhabited by the 
soul.  
3. It is, therefore, clear that this new world represents a positive 
ideal for Lukács. We could say that this is where the utopian dimension 
of Lukács’s argument comes to the surface: “It will then be the task of 
historico-philosophical interpretation to decide whether we are really 
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about to leave the age of absolute sinfulness or whether the new has no 
other herald but our hopes: those hopes which are signs of a world to 
come, still so weak that it can easily be crushed by the sterile power of 
the merely existent.”12  
The hope for a new epic in the age of restored totality, however, 
puts the theory of the novel in a strange position.13 What these concluding 
lines show is that the very theory of the novel is driven by a desire to have 
done with the novel. Once the theory of the novel is complete, it is 
possible that there will be nothing left for it to theorize. As Lukács himself 
suggests, the theory of the novel is already written in a historical moment 
when the first glimpses of a world without the novel have already 
become visible in the discourse novel itself (in Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky). 
Interestingly enough, it is precisely the novel (and as far as Lukács’s text 
is concerned only the novel) that bears witness to the fact that a new and 
happier world without the novel might be coming our way. But, as fragile 
as this vision might be, it is clear that the desired utopian task is to 
actually bring about a world without the novel – a task that the novel itself 
cannot accomplish.14 Nevertheless, the possibility is raised here that the 
theory of the novel is simply the becoming-conscious of the internal 
teleology of the novel form, which amounts to a destruction (or sublation) 
of the form itself. In this sense, the theory of the novel functions here for 
Lukács as the subjective condition of making the world exist by making 
the novel no longer exist.  
This last formulation, however, highlights the strange double 
relationship between the novel and the world in Lukács’s book. On the 
one hand, the two categories are in a relation of full adequation with 
regard to each other in the sense that the novel is the most authentic 
formalization of the contemporary state of the world. Several passages in 
the book suggest a deep identity between the two categories, as if they 
were simply manifestations of the same phenomena in different 
registers. On the other hand, on the level of the utopian desire that 
animates the book, they remain fully irreconcilable with each other. In 
this context, they remain mutually exclusive categories: if the world exists 
as it should exist, the novel ceases to exist; if the novel exists as it really 
is, this world does not yet exist. Of course, we could explain some of 
these complications by highlighting the fundamentally fluid nature of 
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some of Lukács’s categories – for example, we never really get a 
systematic definition of what he means by the “world,” a term whose 
meaning therefore oscillates between “reality” and “totality.” But there 
might be more compelling structural reasons for this simultaneous 
equivalence and irreconcilable difference between the two categories.  
An early clue as to what Lukács means by the “world” comes in the 
first chapter of the book, when he contrasts the ancient Greek world with 
that of modernity:  
The circle within which the Greeks led their metaphysical life was 
smaller than ours: that is why we cannot, as part of our life, place 
ourselves inside it. Or rather, the circle whose closed nature was 
the transcendental essence of their life has, for us, been broken; 
we cannot breathe in a closed world.15  
While the Greeks lived in an essentially homogeneous, closed world (a 
description that amounts to something like a normative definition of what 
it means to inhabit a world as a home), the moderns live in a defective 
world that is a world only in a limited sense as a reality that falls short of 
an ideal. When Lukács draws the consequences of this historical 
change, he claims that, for the moderns, inherited images and forms lost 
their objective self-evidence (since it is now the productivity of the spirit 
that is supposed to unfold their meaning historically); as a result, all 
human-made forms remain essentially incomplete; and the self is 
elevated to the level of being the only true substance since now there is 
an unbridgeable rift between the self and the world.16 Consequently, the 
very possibility of totality is undermined in this world.17 The modern world, 
therefore, is real without being a totality as it is divided into two worlds 
(the world of interiority and the external world – with the latter further 
divided into the world of nature and the world of social convention, first 
nature and second nature). 
This is a significant point because it also reinterprets the function 
of art. For the Greeks, Lukács insists, metaphysics is aesthetics.18 In other 
words, the artistic forms that defined their world were not subjective 
creations but organic consequences of their metaphysics (which, unlike 
philosophy, was experienced immediately as immanent reality). But after 
Kant, we can certainly say that the link between metaphysics and 
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aesthetics (that was once again reinforced by Christianity for a while) 
was irrevocably broken:  
Art, the visionary reality of the world made to our measure, has 
thus become independent: it is no longer a copy, for all the models 
have gone; it is a created totality, for the natural unity of the 
metaphysical spheres has been destroyed forever.19  
The fact that in the modern age an artificial totality replaces the organic 
totality of the ancient Greeks, however, has serious consequences for 
both the world and art. Lukács’s point is quite compelling here: “the very 
disintegration and inadequacy of the world is the precondition for the 
existence of art and its becoming conscious.”20 To paraphrase, then, the 
worldlessness of modernity is the precondition for the very existence of 
art as a self-conscious praxis. The disintegration of the world is the 
foundation of the worldliness of art. And, as we have seen, this is a new 
type of worldliness: art does not provide us a “world” by imitating reality 
but by creating a world where there is now an abyss in being. Art 
becomes worldly in a strong sense: if there is no world, the function of art 
is to create one. If the world existed, art as we know it would not exist.  
The precondition for the existence of art is, therefore, the 
“transcendental homelessness” of artistic creation.21 This means that “the 
old parallelism of the transcendental structure of the form-giving subject 
and the world of created form has been destroyed, and the ultimate 
basis of artistic creation has become homeless.”22 To be more precise, 
every essential historical change takes place by way of the severed link 
between the transcendental subject (that creates forms) and the already 
available created forms. The destruction of this link is the precondition for 
the creation of new forms. But the novel is an exceptional historical form 
because its position is not sufficiently understood if we simply describe it 
as yet another transcendental form among other possibilities. Lukács’s 
point is precisely that in the novel this transcendental homelessness itself 
must become form. Practically all of the internal complications and 
contradictions of the novel form can be derived from this single 
condition: in the novel, the very principle of formalization itself must be 
thematized and problematized. Quite significantly, for Lukács, this is a 
normative argument: a longish prose work in which the impossibility of 
formalization is not immanent to the form is not really a novel.  
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Thus, the internal danger of the novel form can be reduced to two 
extreme possibilities. Either, the novel will overemphasize worldlessness 
and the impossibility of meaning and, therefore, it will cancel out the 
meaning that its paradoxical form demands (a situation that leads to a 
contradiction between its form and content). Or, the novel will 
overemphasize the existence of the world as a closed totality and, 
formally speaking, it will cease to be a novel. But the fragility of the world 
cannot be abolished and it will re-emerge in the form of unprocessed 
raw material that disturbs the formalizing principle that aims to close the 
world. Nevertheless, once again the same paradox becomes visible at 
this point:  
In either case the structure remains abstract: the abstract basis of 
the novel assumes form as a result of the abstraction seeing 
through itself; the immanence of meaning required by the form is 
attained precisely when the author goes all the way, ruthlessly, 
towards exposing its absence.23  
So, this is a clear exposition of the paradoxical nature of the formalization 
of the novel: the immanence of meaning is attained when the form as 
meaning-giving principle is determined by the absence of immanent 
meaning. Form confers meaning on life; but when life is devoid of 
immanent meaning, the formal principle that is adequate to this life 
defies a basic determining function of formalization. When form confers 
meaning, it becomes alien to life.  
To the degree that the central historical task of the novel is to give 
form to the absence of immanent meaning (and, therefore, to the lack of 
immanent forms in modern life), every act of formalization assumes the 
nature of an ethical decision in the novel (i.e., a decision that has no 
ontological guarantees). As a result, the ethical process itself is what is 
immanent in the novel form rather than specific forms. The prominently 
ethical nature of the form guarantees that “the novel, in contrast to other 
genres whose existence resides within the finished form, appears as 
something in the process of becoming.”24 But, as we have seen, the 
formal complication (the structural incompleteness of the novel form) 
carries within itself a certain normative force. Lukács speaks here of a 
“normative incompleteness” that, in reality, only applies to the content of 
the novel (to the incompleteness of the represented world) but not 
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necessarily to its form. To put it differently, if the absence of immanent 
meaning is formalized, meaninglessness is given meaning to the degree 
that it is formalized as the ultimate reality. On the level of form, “the novel 
establishes a fluctuating yet firm balance between becoming and being; 
as the idea of becoming, it becomes a state.”25  
The constitutive paradoxes of the novel (meaninglessness as 
ultimate meaning; formlessness as form; becoming as a state, etc.) are 
eventually all subsumed under the problematic of irony. Lukács deduces 
the necessity of irony in a consistent fashion: if the ethical dimension is a 
structural constituent of the novel form, the danger of subjectivism 
remains a permanent risk in the novel. The nature of this risk is clear: 
without the ontological guarantees of an organic totality that would 
prescribe immanent forms for the artist, the possibility that the artist 
captures only a limited, subjective aspect of life (rather than an existent 
totality) persists. In order to counteract this internal threat, the solution 
has to come from within the novel form itself. This internal solution is 
precisely the ironic division of the subject. This divided subjectivity is 
simultaneously a subjectivity as interiority (which always carries within 
the conditions of subjectivism) and a subjectivity that comprehends the 
limitations of a world divided into an internal and external world. Thus, 
ironic subjectivity allows the duality of the world to persist yet also allows 
the artist to glimpse a unified world “in the mutual relativity of elements 
essentially alien to one another.”26 Once the antagonistic nature of the 
inner and outer worlds is recognized as necessary, the artist has a 
minimal formal principle at their disposal that allows for the projection of 
a purely formal unity:  
The irony of the novel is the self-correction of the world’s fragility: 
inadequate relations can transform themselves into a fanciful yet 
well-ordered round of misunderstandings and cross-purposes, 
within which everything is seen as many-sided, within which 
things appear as isolated and yet connected, as full of value and 
yet totally devoid of it, as abstract fragments and as concrete 
autonomous life, as flowering and as decaying, as the infliction of 
suffering and as suffering itself.27  
This is the upside-down world of the novel, where the fundamental 
worldlessness of modernity ironically appears as a unified world.  
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The nature of this irony can be, then, summarized in reference to 
the most often quoted thesis of the text:  
The novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life 
is no longer directly given, in which the immanence of meaning in 
life has become a problem, yet which still thinks in terms of 
totality.28  
We can, then, paraphrase this thesis (no doubt, in a tendentious manner) 
in the following terms: the novel is the paradoxical form of an age that 
knows very well that the world does not exist yet still needs to think in 
terms of the world. The novel is the ironic longing for a world in an age 
that is not quite ready yet to give up the idea of the world. The power of 
Lukács’s thought, however, manifests itself in his insistence on the 
“double irony” at work here.29 On the one hand, the search for meaning 
that constitutes the novel is a futile struggle; yet it is impossible to 
abandon the struggle. On the other hand, while irony depicts reality as 
victorious over human ideals, it also reveals that this victory is never quite 
final. This melancholy insight is the state that he calls “mature virility.”30 
What is left of the world in the novel is, therefore, a result of this double 
impossibility: the impossibility of the world cannot be separated from the 
impossibility of total worldlessness. The novel is defined by the surprising 
yet elusive emergence of meaning in the midst of absolute 
meaninglessness.31 It is this structure that allows Lukács to 
simultaneously assert the radical incompatibility of the novel and the 
world as well as their fundamental identity.32  
In light of the utopian anti-novelistic or, at least, post-novelistic 
desire behind The Theory of the Novel that was fuelled by the rejection of 
the historical worldlessness of the moment of its inception, it might be 
necessary to re-examine what Lukács says about the utopian nature of 
the novel itself. It is important to note, then, that Lukács unconditionally 
affirms the utopian dimension of the novel form although he gives it a 
specific meaning. He calls the properly understood utopianism 
immanent to the novel form “a priori utopianism.”33 Two things should be 
immediately obvious: on the one hand, this utopianism has nothing to do 
with “empirical” utopias (i.e., with utopias as sensuous realities); on the 
other hand, by locating the question of utopia on the level of the 
transcendental constitution of forms, Lukács identifies the utopian 
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dimension with the problem of form rather than content. The utopianism 
of the novel has to do with the way the novel form itself is constituted: it is 
the novel form as such that has a utopian dimension and not specific 
instantiations of this form. This utopianism must be located precisely on 
the level of the inherent paradox of the novel form: the utopian moment 
comes to the surface when we perceive that the novel is the 
formalization of the impossibility of immanent forms.  
Lukács describes the “ethical problem of Utopia” as “the question 
whether the ability to imagine a better world can be ethically justified, 
and the question whether this ability can serve as the starting point for a 
life that is rounded in itself.”34 But if we are talking about an a priori 
utopianism, the ability to imagine a better world must be an a priori 
problem, while the realization of such an imagination is an ethical one. 
Either way, the distance separating the utopian desire both from the 
transcendental forms that it can receive and the ethical actualizations of 
these forms in historical reality must remain absolute in order for this 
desire to be genuinely utopian: 
To create, by purely artistic means, a reality which corresponds to 
this dream world, or at least is more adequate to it than the 
existing one, is only an illusory solution. The Utopian longing of the 
soul is a legitimate desire, worthy of being the centre of a world, 
only if it is absolutely incapable of being satisfied in the present 
intellectual state of man, that is to say incapable of being satisfied 
in any world that can be imagined and given form, whether past, 
present or mythical. If a world can be found that satisfies the 
longing, this only proves that the dissatisfaction with the present 
was merely an artistic quibbling over its outward forms, an 
aesthetic hankering after times when the artist could draw with 
more generous lines or paint with brighter colours than today. 
Such longings can indeed be satisfied, but their inner emptiness 
becomes apparent in the work’s lack of idea.35  
A genuinely utopian desire is, therefore, worldless: although it is based on 
the rejection of an actually existing world, no world can be found that 
satisfies this longing. To put it differently, this utopian desire is legitimate 
(as the curious center of a world) only if it cannot be given a 
predetermined form with a determinate content. But if it were to remain 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
(What does it mean to) Think the Novel? 
 
 82 
forever alien to formalization, it would simply disappear in the darkest 
depths of the soul. Such a utopian desire, therefore, manifests itself by 
marking the limits of the imagination. True utopian desire refers us to 
what is unimaginable and must remain unimaginable in a given 
historical moment. We can speak of an “a priori utopianism,” therefore, 
when the transcendental limits of the imagination themselves take on a 
historical function: the fact that the imagination is structurally limited 
becomes the guarantee of the possibility of a historical reality beyond the 
present.  
So, what is interesting is that Lukács’s reflections on the utopian 
dimension of the novel form suggest that it has a structural relation to 
what remains forever unimaginable. The utopian dimension of the novel 
is truly utopian only when it refers us to an unimaginable ideal. If the ideal 
projected by the novel could be realized in an actually existing world that 
is currently imaginable, strictly speaking this dimension would cease to 
be utopian. It would be a mere a correction of our reality on the level of 
content but would not actually concern the problem of the form of this 
world – the transcendental constitution of this reality. There must be 
something present in the novel that will never assume the form of a 
world.  
As far as the novel form is concerned, then, two things follow from 
this definition of legitimate utopian desire. On the one hand, when a 
novel presents an imaginable utopia, it strictly speaking ceases to be a 
novel. On the other hand, in order to be a real novel, even if it apparently 
has nothing utopian about its contents, its form must be marked by the 
unimaginable utopian dimension. The inherent contingency of 
formalization that is the essence of the novel form becomes here a 
correlate of the transcendental limits of the imagination. Every act of 
novelistic formalization that is by necessity aware of its own contingency 
is also aware of the limitations of the imagination. This limitation, 
however, is not the external ruin of the form but a principle that must 
become inherent to the form itself. The novelist is free to give form to the 
absence of immanent meaning in life, but this freedom is limited by its 
own conditions in that the novelist cannot imagine the world that is the 
object of the utopian desire produced by the contingency of forms. The 
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transcendental limit of the novelistic imagination is its very condition of 
possibility.  
So, what is it exactly that the novel cannot imagine even though 
the longing for an unimaginable utopia is a core constituent of its form? 
The answer is clear: a world without the novel. The paradox of the novel, 
as we have seen, is that it gives form to the immanent meaninglessness 
of life. As a result, it cannot avoid the risk of giving meaning to 
meaninglessness. This act of formalization (that reintroduces meaning in 
the midst of meaninglessness), therefore, projects the utopian possibility 
of a meaning that would make the novel form an inadequate expression 
of the metaphysical status of a world abandoned by God. Every true 
novel is, therefore, a preparation for a world without the novel, and yet it 
must be unable to imagine this world as an actual historical reality. In 
case this dimension is absent or is reduced to an imaginable utopia, as 
far as Lukács is concerned, we are no longer talking about a genuine 
novel. Thus, the specificity of the novel form is not that it can project 
“possible worlds” for us (as other literary forms can do that as well), but 
that it structurally refers us to an impossible world without the novel. And 
Lukács repeatedly insists on the point that only the novel can do the 
latter.  
If the impossible imagination of a world without the novel is an 
internal element of the novel form, its effectivity manifests itself 
immediately in the present rather than in the future of the novel. To the 
degree that Lukács decrees a ban on actually imagining this future 
within the novel itself, he suggests simultaneously that this impeded 
imagination becomes a structuring force of the form itself and that the 
realization of this world will take place outside or independently of the 
novel. But, then, the utopianism of The Theory of the Novel is itself an 
instrumentalization of a novelistic desire against the novel. To put it 
differently, the theory of the novel functions here as an attempt to isolate 
a formal element of the novel (the longing for a world without the novel) 
in order to declare it to be the engine of the historical dialectic of the 
novel form.  
Lukács’s typology of the novel form in the second half of the book 
is clearly driven by this insight. The original manifestation of the novel 
form in what he calls “abstract idealism” (Don Quixote) is negated by its 
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logical opposite “romantic disillusionment” (Sentimental Education). 
Lukács clearly identifies these two basic types as exercises in a priori 
utopianism:  
The romanticism of disillusionment not only followed abstract 
idealism in time and history, it was also conceptually its heir, the 
next historico-philosophical step in a priori utopianism.36  
In the case of abstract idealism, the utopian transformation of the world 
remains unimaginable because the challenge to the world is simply 
crushed by the brute force of reality. In the case of the romanticism of 
disillusionment, the defeat of the individual is already a precondition of 
the form as subjective interiority is completely cut off from the possibility 
of effective action.  
The logical synthesis provided by the Bildungsroman (Wilhelm 
Meister’s Years of Apprenticeship), therefore, appears on the scene of 
history as the overcoming of these mutually irreconcilable forms of 
utopianism. It offers us the practical utopia of the pragmatic 
reconciliation of the internal and external worlds, which makes effective 
action in social reality possible once again through the active production 
of the community by way of education. Social convention assumes the 
role of a mediating agency between interiority and the world, since 
convention is open to at least partial penetration by meaning. This kind of 
novel, however, runs a double risk. On the one hand, it might 
overemphasize subjectivity and present the education of a single 
individual that cannot be generalized as a common destiny. On the other 
hand, it might romanticize a specific segment of reality to the degree that 
it becomes absolutely non-problematic (and, therefore, something like a 
fairy tale). Either way, the self’s antagonistic relationship to the world can 
be reconciled only through a compromise that in essence amounts to a 
non-novelistic intervention into the novel form.37 
So, the dialectic does not stop here and a fourth step is necessary: 
the utopian imagination of the world without the novel must actually 
accede to the destruction of the novel form itself. This final step manifests 
itself through an inherent possibility of the novel that Lukács describes as 
“the overlapping of the novel form into the epic,” which amounts to 
imputing “a substantiality to the world it describes which that world is in 
no way capable of sustaining and keeping in balance.”38 In other words, 
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the historical overcoming of the novel form will come about by way of an 
internal possibility of the form that returns it to the epic. The precondition 
of this return of the epic is the unattainable “utopian demand of the soul” 
to find an outside world that is adequate to the soul as interiority.39 The 
utopian anti-novelist longing is, therefore, an epic desire. At first, this 
longing manifests itself as the rejection of the conventional world, which 
is easily contained within the novel form as a subjective attitude. But if it 
ceases to be merely an inner attitude, it begins to threaten the novelistic 
form itself:  
Such overlapping is, however, unavoidable if the Utopian rejection 
of the conventional world objectivises itself in a likewise existent 
reality, so that polemical refusal actually becomes the central form 
of the work. No such possibility was given by the historical 
development of Western Europe.40  
This is why Lukács claims that Tolstoy represents the novel’s maximum 
overlap into the epic.41 Western European cultures conceived of the 
relation between the internal and external worlds exclusively in negative 
polemical terms. But, according to Lukács, Russian literature was 
produced under completely different “organic natural conditions” that 
made it possible for this literature to be “creatively polemical.”42 In 
Tolstoy’s novels, the opposition of social convention and nature is 
overcome temporarily in “great moments” of insight when the meaning of 
life is revealed to some characters. But these great moments remain only 
passing experiences of essential life and do not allow themselves to be 
transformed into collective life. To put it differently, within the novels, they 
remain utopian moments of longing for a more adequate external world. 
So, while in Tolstoy’s works “intimations of a breakthrough into a new 
epoch are visible,” in Dostoevsky’s fiction “this new world, remote from 
any struggle against what actually exists, is drawn for the first time simply 
as seen reality.”43 This is why “Dostoevsky did not write novels” as he 
“belongs to the new world.”44 As a result of this non-polemical acceptance 
of existence, the utopian desire is presumably no longer operative in his 
writings. Dostoevsky’s works are potentially already the epics of a world 
without the novel. The novel form itself comes to an end when the desire 
for a world without the novel is no longer operative. Or, to put it 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
(What does it mean to) Think the Novel? 
 
 86 
differently, the novel lasts exactly as long as the desire for a world without 
the novel since without the latter there can be no novel.  
This is the point where a crucial metaphysical limitation of 
Lukács’s argument surfaces. For, it is clear that while he finds it easy to 
imagine the possibility of a world without the novel, what appears to be 
impossible to conceive of within the horizon of The Theory of the Novel 
is, what we could call, a novel without the world. The unimaginable 
historical break that Dostoevsky bears witness to retains the category of 
the world at the expense of the novel. But if the new epoch will still 
present itself to us as a “world,” albeit a world that is now adequate to the 
longings of the soul, it is not entirely clear that we have completely left 
the old epoch behind. Lukács’s opening arguments made it clear that the 
“happy ages” of the epic did not yet know the inside/outside division 
since the immanence of meaning created a truly homogenous world: 
“Being and destiny, adventure and accomplishment, life and essence are 
then identical concepts” (30). In a world like this, the very division 
between the human being and the world is fully included in this 
homogeneity since substantiality is equally distributed among all existing 
things (including the soul). To put it differently, Lukács’s point is not that 
for the Greeks there was no difference between the soul and the world. 
The difference between the soul and the world was real, but it was 
exactly like any other difference that made up the totality of being. 
Modernity, therefore, distinguishes itself from this age by elevating 
this one single difference to the level of a central and irreconcilable gap, 
an absolute difference that supposedly organizes all other differences 
around itself. As a result, in this age, substantiality was increasingly 
concentrated in subjective interiority. The same way that “art” according 
to Lukács did not exist as an autonomous, self-conscious praxis before 
this historical break, we could argue that the “world” itself did not exist 
before the abyss of this single difference became the only essential 
relation. Following Lukács’s argument, we can make two important 
observations on the way the idea of the world functions here. On the one 
hand, Lukács’s historical argument suggests that the “world” came into 
being precisely at the moment when the world no longer could perform 
its function as an organic homogeneous totality – in other words, when it 
ceased to be a world. On the other hand, the birth of this world without a 
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world is a direct correlate of the transcendental constitution of the novel 
form. As we have seen, the function of art in this age is to create a world 
where there is no longer a world. The novel form, therefore, is simply the 
most appropriate artistic formalization of the epistemological problem of 
an incomplete world. It is in this sense that we could say that the world 
remains a “novelistic” concept in The Theory of the Novel. But if this is in 
fact that case, a world without the novel would also have to be a world in 
which the novelistic concept of the world no longer fulfils any meaningful 
roles. When the age of the novel comes to an end, the world as we know 
it will also expire.  
If our thought experiment to separate the novel and the world from 
each other were to produce any pragmatic results, they would have to be 
the products of a delicate inversion of the Lukácsean formula. Lukács 
found it quite easy to separate the two concepts as long as he could hold 
on to the world. But what happens to the novel when we approach it 
from the perspective of a radical worldlessness that is not the temporary 
loss of a world that can be restored in a utopian future? The possibility of 
a genuinely counter-Lukácsean hypothesis emerges here that, at this 
point, exists only in the form of a few basic questions: Would it be 
possible to reread the history of the novel from the perspective of the 
immemorial and irreparable ruin of the world? What if what becomes 
legible in the novel is not a nostalgia for the world but the fact that the 
world never existed—– and that is not such a bad thing after all? These 
questions gesture in the direction of a new metaphysics of the novel that 
would be truly utopian in the sense that in it the novel could find 
absolutely no place for itself in the world.  
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their life was based. For totality as the formative prime reality of every individual 
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Theory of the Novel, 34. 
18 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 34. 
19 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 37. 
20 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 38. 
21 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 41.  
22 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 41.  
23 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 72. 
24 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 72. 
25 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 73.  
26 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 75. 
27 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 75. 
28 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 56. 
29 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 85.  
30 Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 85. 
31 As he puts it, this is why irony is the “objectivity of the novel” (90). Although irony is a 
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toward subjectivism. This also means that it is the subjective principle that cancels out 
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the world does not mean that this is simply a godless world without any reference to a 
transcendent domain. The failure applies on both sides: the world fails to accede to 
God; but it also fails to give up this struggle to reach God. This is how demons are 
created who are no longer or not yet gods. This is a demonic world, then, that is caught 
somewhere between a world ruled by God and a fully godless world.  
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providential actions, etc.” See, Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, 142. The introduction of 
this ironically miraculous element (as the miracle is given a purely profane content), 
however, reintroduces an epic dimension to the text.  
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